



HIROSHIMA:

We Made the Decision





ford
mos

1945.7.16

Chicago

Oak Ridge

Washington

(参謀本部)

原爆投下命令
1945.7.24

Truman
大統領
Potsdam
Potsdam会談
(1945.7.17-8.2)

Harry S. Truman
Henry L. Stimson & McGeorge Bundy
J. Robert Oppenheimer
Herbert Feis

**HIROSHIMA:
WE MADE THE DECISION**

edited with notes
by
Yoshiyuki Nakai

SANSHUSHA

は し が き

本書は、アメリカの大学の政治学の教材として編集された広島・長崎原爆投下決定に関する資料集二種*の中から、特に重要な文献四編を集めて、日本の大学の教養課程の英語教材として編集したものである。

収録したのは、原爆投下決定の最終責任者である第33代アメリカ大統領 Harry S. Truman, 原爆製造計画の発端から製造された爆弾の広島・長崎投下に至るまで、終始一貫この計画の最高指導者であった陸軍長官 Henry L. Stimson, Los Alamos の秘密原爆研究所所長として原爆製造に最も直接貢献した科学者であり、また、日本への無警告原爆投下が決定される過程で、決定的な役割を演じた J. Robert Oppenheimer 博士の三人の証言に、歴史的見地からアメリカの立場の弁明を試みた外交史家 Herbert Feis の概括的発言を加えた四編である。

広島・長崎への原爆投下決定は、おそらく人類史上最大の政治決定であり、米国民の間においては、今日なお生々しい現実政治の問題として、その可否をめぐる議論が続けられ、大学の一般教養課程や政治学の専門コースでも広く学ばれて、学生達の討論の課題となっている。当時の米国の政治・軍事・科学の指導者達が、いかなる理由のもとにいかなる過程を経て、原爆製造計画を発案し、実行し、そして原爆を完成せしめ、さらに日本に投下する決定をなして、現実に広島・長崎両都市にこれを投下せしめるに至ったか、ということは、これらの当事者の言明をはじめとする種々の資料を通じて、米国民の間には広く知られた事実となっている。

これに対してわが国の大学においては、原爆投下決定のような具体的な現代史上の事実が、教室において討論されたり講義されたりすることはほとんどない。従って、このようなテーマに関する資料を集めた教材も存在しない。ここに収録する一連のドキュメントは、アメリカの学生達が、広く一般に知っているものであるのに対し、日本の若者の間で知る者は、極めて稀なのである。

日本人は、世界唯一の原爆被災国民として、核兵器廃絶を訴え続けて来た。しかし、被災国民という被害者の立場からのみこの問題を見がちなわれわれは、原爆を投下した側のアメリカ人達が、いかなる論理をもって、かの運命の暴挙に手を下すに至ったかということを考えてみる機会を持たない。

原爆投下決定は、決定をなしたアメリカ人達のみのものでなく、被害者たる日本人一個の問題でもなく、地球上の全ての人間の未来を決定する出来事であった。本書に収録したドキュメントの著者達——Truman, Stimson, Oppenheimer の三者は、未来永遠に人類の運命を決したこの決定を行なった人々である。原爆投下に関して Truman は自ら “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it... I had made the

decision.”とわるびれることもなく言明し、また Stimson も、“The ultimate responsibility for the recommendation to the President rested upon me, and I have no desire to veil it.”と自らの責任を明らかにしている。また Oppenheimer を委員長とする四人の科学者からなる諮問委員会の答申文中の “We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.” という句は、Truman, Stimson 両者共に、彼等の決断の最終的な依拠として引用しているもので、この点では Oppenheimerこそ最終責任者と言えるかも知れない。

Truman も Stimson も Oppenheimer も、既にこの世の人ではない。原爆開発を発案し、かの Manhattan 計画を遂行し、そして原爆を日本に落とさしめた当時のアメリカの政治・軍事・科学の指導者達は、今やその全てが物故者である。しかし、彼等の遺して行った厄介な遺産を背負って、われわれは生きていかねばならない。

政治学の教室で、これらのドキュメントを読むことのない日本の学生達が、せめてこれを英語の授業で読んで一人でも多く、この人類史上唯一度の決断をなした人々の言葉を知っておいてもらいたいという願いから、この小冊を刊行するものである。

1982年7月16日

東京・吉祥寺にて 中井義幸

*Edwin Fogelman ed., *Hiroshima: The Decision to Use the A-Bomb*, Scribner Research Anthologies (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964)

Paul R. Baker ed., *The Atomic Bomb: the Great Decision* (Hinsdale, Illinois, The Dryden Press, Second Revised Edition, 1976)

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Year of Decisions

Harry S. Truman

The historic message of the first explosion of an atomic bomb was flashed to me in a message from Secretary of War Stimson on the morning of July 16. The most secret and the most daring enterprise of the war had succeeded. We were now in possession of a weapon that would not only revolutionize war but could alter the course of 5 history and civilization. This news reached me at Potsdam the day after I had arrived for the conference of the Big Three.

Preparations were being rushed for the test atomic explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico, at the time I had to leave for Europe, and on the voyage over I had been anxiously awaiting 10 word on the results. I had been told of many predictions by the scientists, but no one was certain of the outcome of this full-scale atomic explosion. As I read the message from Stimson, I realized that the test not only met the most optimistic expectation of the scientists but that the United States had in its possession an 15 explosive force of unparalleled power.

Stimson flew to Potsdam the next day to see me and brought with him the full details of the test. I received him at once and called in Secretary of State Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Arnold, and Admiral King to join us at my 20 office at the Little White House. We reviewed our military

strategy in the light of this revolutionary development. We were not ready to make use of this weapon against the Japanese, although we did not know as yet what effect the new weapon might have, physically or psychologically, when used against
5 the enemy. For that reason the military advised that we go ahead with the existing military plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands.

At Potsdam, as elsewhere, the secret of the atomic bomb was kept closely guarded. We did not extend the very small circle of
10 Americans who knew about it. Churchill naturally knew about the atomic bomb project from its very beginning, because it had involved the pooling of British and American technical skill.

On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier
15 showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make "good use of it against the Japanese."

A month before the test explosion of the atomic bomb the service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had laid their
20 detailed plans for the defeat of Japan before me for approval. There had apparently been some differences of opinion as to the best route to be followed, but these had evidently been reconciled, for when General Marshall had presented his plan for a two-phase invasion of Japan, Admiral King and General
25 Arnold had supported the proposal heartily.

The Army plan envisaged an amphibious landing in the fall of 1945 on the island of Kyushu, the southernmost of the Japanese home islands. This would be accomplished by our Sixth Army, under the command of General Walter Krueger. The first

landing would then be followed approximately four months later by a second great invasion, which would be carried out by our Eighth and Tenth Armies, followed by the First Army transferred from Europe, all of which would go ashore in the Kanto plains area near Tokyo. In all, it had been estimated 5 that it would require until the late fall of 1946 to bring Japan to her knees.

This was a formidable conception, and all of us realized fully that the fighting would be fierce and the losses heavy. But it was hoped that some of Japan's forces would continue to be 10 preoccupied in China and others would be prevented from reinforcing the home islands if Russia were to enter the war.

There was, of course, always the possibility that the Japanese might choose to surrender sooner. Our air and fleet units had begun to inflict heavy damage on industrial and urban sites 15 in Japan proper. Except in China, the armies of the Mikado had been pushed back everywhere in relentless successions of defeats.

Acting Secretary of State Grew had spoken to me in late May about issuing a proclamation that would urge the Japanese to 20 surrender but would assure them that we would permit the Emperor to remain as head of the state. Grew backed this with arguments taken from his ten years' experience as our Ambassador in Japan, and I told him that I had already given thought to this matter myself and that it seemed to me a sound idea. Grew 25 had a draft of a proclamation with him, and I instructed him to send it by the customary channels to the Joint Chiefs and the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee in order that we might get the opinions of all concerned before I made my

decision.

On June 18 Grew reported that the proposal had met with the approval of his Cabinet colleagues and of the Joint Chiefs. The military leaders also discussed the subject with me when they reported the same day. Grew, however, favored issuing the proclamation at once, to coincide with the closing of the campaign on Okinawa, while the service chiefs were of the opinion that we should wait until we were ready to follow a Japanese refusal with the actual assault of our invasion forces.

10 It was my decision then that the proclamation to Japan should be issued from the forthcoming conference at Potsdam. This, I believed, would clearly demonstrate to Japan and to the world that the Allies were united in their purpose. By that time, also, we might know more about two matters of significance for our
15 future effort: the participation of the Soviet Union and the atomic bomb. We knew that the bomb would receive its first test in mid-July. If the test of the bomb was successful, I wanted to afford Japan a clear chance to end the fighting before we made use of this newly gained power. If the test should fail, then it
20 would be even more important to us to bring about a surrender before we had to make a physical conquest of Japan. General Marshall told me that it might cost half a million American lives to force the enemy's surrender on his home grounds.

But the test was now successful. The entire development of
25 the atomic bomb had been dictated by military considerations. The idea of the atomic bomb had been suggested to President Roosevelt by the famous and brilliant Dr. Albert Einstein, and its development turned out to be a vast undertaking. It was the achievement of the combined efforts of science, industry,

labor, and the military, and it had no parallel in history. The men in charge and their staffs worked under extremely high pressure, and the whole enormous task required the services of more than one hundred thousand men and immense quantities of material. It required over two and a half years and necessitated 5 the expenditure of two and a half billions of dollars.

Only a handful of the thousands of men who worked in these plants knew what they were producing. So strict was the secrecy imposed that even some of the highest-ranking officials in Washington had not the slightest idea of what was going on. I 10 did not. Before 1939 it had been generally agreed among scientists that it was theoretically possible to release energy from the atom. In 1940 we had begun to pool with Great Britain all scientific knowledge useful to war, although Britain was at war at that time and we were not. Following this—in 1942—we 15 learned that the Germans were at work on a method to harness atomic energy for use as a weapon of war. This, we understood, was to be added to the V-1 and V-2 rockets with which they hoped to conquer the world. They failed, of course, and for this we can thank Providence. But now a race was on to make the 20 atomic bomb—a race that became “the battle of the laboratories.”

It was under the general policy of pooling knowledge between our nation and Great Britain that research on the atomic bomb started in such feverish secrecy. American and British scientists joined in the race against the Germans. We in America had 25 available a great number of distinguished scientists in many related fields of knowledge, and we also had another great advantage. We could provide the tremendous industrial and economic resources required for the project—a vastly expensive

project—without injury to our war production program. Furthermore, our plants were far removed from the reach of enemy bombing. Britain, whose scientists had initiated the project and were contributing much of the original atomic data, was constantly
5 exposed to enemy bombing and, when she started the atomic research, also faced the possibility of invasion.

For these reasons Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to pool the research and concentrate all of the work on the development of the project within the United States. Working together with the
10 British, we thus made it possible to achieve a great scientific triumph in the field of atomic energy. Nevertheless, basic and historic as this event was, it had to be considered at the time as relatively incidental to the far-flung war we were fighting in the Pacific at terrible cost in American lives.

15 We could hope for a miracle, but the daily tragedy of a bitter war crowded in on us. We labored to construct a weapon of such overpowering force that the enemy could be forced to yield swiftly once we could resort to it. This was the primary aim of our secret and vast effort. But we also had to carry out the
20 enormous effort of our basic and traditional military plans.

The task of creating the atomic bomb had been entrusted to a special unit of the Army Corps of Engineers, the so-called Manhattan District, headed by Major General Leslie R. Groves. The primary effort, however, had come from British and
25 American scientists working in laboratories and offices scattered throughout the nation.

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the distinguished physicist from the University of California, had set up the key establishment in the whole process at Los Alamos, New Mexico. More than any

other one man, Oppenheimer is to be credited with the achievement of the completed bomb.

My own knowledge of these developments had come about only after I became President, when Secretary Stimson had given me the full story. He had told me at that time that the project ⁵ was nearing completion and that a bomb could be expected within another four months. It was at his suggestion, too, that I had then set up a committee of top men and had asked them to study with great care the implications the new weapon might have for us. ¹⁰

Secretary Stimson headed this group as chairman, and the other members were George L. Harrison, president of the New York Life Insurance Company, who was then serving as a special assistant to the Secretary of War; James F. Byrnes, as my personal representative; Ralph A. Bard, Under Secretary of the ¹⁵ Navy; Assistant Secretary William L. Clayton for the State Department; and three of our most renowned scientists—Dr. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington and Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development; Dr. Karl T. Compton, president of the Massachusetts ²⁰ Institute of Technology and Chief of Field Service in the Office of Scientific Research and Development; and Dr. James B. Conant, president of Harvard University and chairman of the National Defense Research Committee.

This committee was assisted by a group of scientists, of whom ²⁵ those most prominently connected with the development of the atomic bomb were Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Arthur H. Compton, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, and the Italian-born Dr. Enrico Fermi. The conclusions reached by these men, both in the advisory

committee of scientists and in the larger committee, were brought to me by Secretary Stimson on June 1.

It was their recommendation that the bomb be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done. They recommended further that it should be used without specific warning and against a target that would clearly show its devastating strength. I had realized, of course, that an atomic bomb explosion would inflict damage and casualties beyond imagination. On the other hand, the scientific advisers of the committee reported, "We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." It was their conclusion that no technical demonstration they might propose, such as over a deserted island, would be likely to bring the war to an end. It had to be used against an enemy target.

The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me. Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used. The top military advisers to the President recommended its use, and when I talked to Churchill he unhesitatingly told me that he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to end the war.

In deciding to use this bomb I wanted to make sure that it would be used as a weapon of war in the manner prescribed by the laws of war. That meant that I wanted it dropped on a military target. I had told Stimson that the bomb should be dropped as nearly as possibly upon a war production center of prime military importance.

Stimson's staff had prepared a list of cities in Japan that might serve as targets. Kyoto, though favored by General

Arnold as a center of military activity, was eliminated when Secretary Stimson pointed out that it was a cultural and religious shrine of the Japanese.

Four cities were finally recommended as targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki. They were listed in that order as targets for the first attack. The order of selection was in accordance with the military importance of these cities, but allowance would be given for weather conditions at the time of the bombing. Before the selected targets were approved as proper for military purposes, I personally went over them in detail with Stimson, Marshall, and Arnold, and we discussed the matter of timing and the final choice of the first target.

General Spaatz, who commanded the Strategic Air Forces, which would deliver the bomb on the target, was given some latitude as to when and on which of the four targets the bomb would be dropped. That was necessary because of weather and other operational considerations. In order to get preparations under way, the War Department was given orders to instruct General Spaatz that the first bomb would be dropped as soon after August 3 as weather would permit. The order to General Spaatz read as follows:

24 July 1945

To: General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General

United States Army Strategic Air Forces

25

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific

personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.

5 2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.

3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and
10 the President of the United States. No communique on the subject or release of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.

4. The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with
15 the approval of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, U.S.A. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information.

/s/ Thos. T. Handy
General, GSC
Acting Chief of Staff

20

With this order the wheels were set in motion for the first use of an atomic weapon against a military target. I had made the decision. I also instructed Stimson that the order would
25 stand unless I notified him that the Japanese reply to our ultimatum was acceptable.

A specialized B-29 unit, known as the 509th Composite Group, had been selected for the task, and seven of the modified B-29's, with pilots and crews, were ready and waiting for orders. Mean-
30 while ships and planes were rushing the materials for the bomb and specialists to assemble them to the Pacific island of Tinian

in the Marianas.

On July 28, Radio Tokyo announced that the Japanese government would continue to fight. There was no formal reply to the joint ultimatum of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. There was no alternative now. The bomb was 5 scheduled to be dropped after August 3 unless Japan surrendered before that day.

On August 6, the fourth day of the journey home from Potsdam, came the historic news that shook the world. I was eating lunch with members of the *Augusta's* crew when Captain 10 Frank Graham, White House Map Room watch officer, handed me the following message:

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Big bomb dropped on Hiroshima August 5 at 7:15 P.M. Washington 15 time. First reports indicate complete success which was even more conspicuous than earlier test. . . .

Potsdam Declaration

1. We—the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

5. Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

7. Until such a new order is established and there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.


10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.

11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just repara-

tions in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.


5 12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.



10 13. We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.



Atomic Laboratory: Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Atomic Laboratory: Hanford, Washington





The first atomic bomb exploded at Alamogordo, New Mexico, July 16, 1945. When it died down it left a half mile wide crater, ten feet deep at the center, and sand within the crater had been burned and boiled into a highly radioactive, jade-green, glassy crust.

NOTES

Year of Decisions

Harry S. Truman (1884—1972)

第33代アメリカ大統領。1945年4月、Roosevelt 大統領の死去により、副大統領より昇格して大統領に就任、第二次大戦の最終局面の指導と戦後処理とに当たり、大戦後の世界の進路に大きな影響を及ぼした。Truman が、大統領就任後直ちに処置を迫られた重大問題は、数ヶ月後に完成が予定されていた原子爆弾の運命を決定することであった。彼は、陸軍長官 Henry L. Stimson を委員長とし、八名の政府各機関代表及び学者代表からなる、いわゆる「スティムソン臨時委員会」を任命し、さらにその諮問機関として、J. Robert Oppenheimer を委員長とする、四人の原子物理学者からなる「科学者諮問委員会」を設けて、この問題を討議させた。1945年6月1日、Oppenheimer 等は、生まれ来る原爆を対日戦に無警告で使用すべきことを答申、「スティムソン委員会」もこれを採択して、大統領に答申した。Truman は、7月16日ドイツの戦後処理をイギリス首相 Churchill、ソ連首相 Stalin と議するためにベルリン郊外 Potsdam に在って、Alamogordo に於ける第一号原爆実験成功のニュースを聞き、軍事優先の見地から、続いて完成して来るべき二発の原爆を、対日戦に戦略上最も有効な方法で使用すべきことを、大統領の権限に於て決定した。7月24日、米戦略空軍司令官 Carl Spaatz 大將は、8月3日以降、天候をみはからって、広島・小倉・新潟・長崎の四市のいずれかに、原爆を投下すべき命令を受けた。7月26日、「Potsdam 宣言」が発せられ、同28日の鈴木日本首相の声明を同宣言拒否と解した米側は、既に下されていた原爆投下命令を実行に移し、8月6日、広島に原爆は投下された。

以下に録するのは、Truman の回想録の第一部「1945年：諸決断の年」の中の、この問題に関する部分の抜粋である。文中に自ら認めるように、Truman は、原爆広島・長崎投下を決定した最終責任者である。

P. L.

- 1 2 **Secretary of War Stimson** 本書所載 “The Atomic Bomb and the Surrender of Japan” の著者。第2編の最初の注参照。
- 7 **the conference of the Big Three** 「ポツダム三巨頭会談」 1945年7月17日—8月2日、ベルリン郊外 Potsdam に、アメリカ大統領 Truman、イギリス首相 Churchill (ただし、会議中、保守党が選挙に敗れ、労働党の新首相 Attlee と交代)、ソ連首相 Stalin が会して、戦後処理を議した。

- 9 **Alamogordo, New Mexico** 表紙裏の地図参照。ニューメキシコ州 Alamogordo の北北西約100キロの砂漠中にあるこの地点は、今日戦時中のその暗号名 Trinity により、“The Trinity Site”の名を以て知られる。
- 19 **Secretary of State Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Arnold, and Admiral King.** Leahy, Marshall, Arnold, King の四名は、それぞれ、大統領、陸軍、空軍、海軍の軍司令官として参謀本部 (Joint Chiefs of Staff) を形成する、作戦面での最高指導者。これに文官の側を代表して、國務長官 Byrnes, 陸軍長官 Stimson, 海軍長官 Forrestal の三者が加わり、最高作戦会議が形成されるが、ここには海軍長官 Forrestal が欠けている。
- 21 **the Little White House** Truman 大統領以下のアメリカ勢は、ベルリン入りすると、ベルリンの南東20キロ、ポツダムととの中間点にある湖に面した避暑地 Babelsberg に陣取り、二軒の villa を接收して、オフィスとした。そのうち、Truman 自身が使用した Kaiserstrasse 2 の黄色い三階建の家の方を、“the Little White House” のニックネームで呼んでいたものである。
- 2 6 **the existing military plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands** 既に6月18日、White House に於ける最高作戦会議に於て決定していた日本上陸作戦。1945年11月1日を期して、九州上陸作戦を開始し、翌1946年春、本州上陸を実行するというもの。下述。
- 12 **the pooling of British and American technical skill** 米英両国間の軍事技術共同開発協定を指す。原爆開発の Manhattan 計画は、当初からこの協定の下に、米英両国の共同計画として企画・遂行されたもので、米大統領と英国首相に直統の「統合政策委員会」(Combined Policy Committee) によって運営されていた。
- 14 **The Russian Premier showed no special interest.** この時 Stalin は、Truman の言う “a new weapon of unusual destructive force” が、原爆であるとは悟らなかつたと言われる。彼は、8月6日の広島原爆投下のニュースを聞いて初めてアメリカの原爆所有を知り、驚いたと言われる。
- 18 **A month before the test explosion... approval.** 6月18日に開かれた國務・陸軍・海軍三省の長官及び参謀本部の四人の司令官からなる最高作戦会議。ただし、当時、國務長官は空席(後任の Byrnes は7月3日就任)で、國務次官(Under Secretary)の元駐日大使 Joseph C. Grew が、國務長官代行として出席していた。
- 23 **when General Marshall... the proposal heartily.** Marshall 大将は、米英両国軍を統轄する統合参謀本部(Combined Chiefs of Staff)の総長として、作戦面での最高指導者であった。これに、海軍作戦部長 King, 空軍司令官 Arnold も、全面的に賛成し、陸海空三軍が一致結束して、

日本上陸作戦を承認したというものである。

- 26 **an amphibious landing** 米軍がノルマンディー上陸作戦に用いたような、水陸両用の上陸用舟艇及び水陸両用戦車による上陸作戦。
- 28 **our Sixth Army, under the command of General Walter Krueger** 1943年2月、MacArthur 総司令官下の太平洋方面連合軍の一翼として組織された Krueger 中将指揮下の第六軍団。ニューギニア・フィリピン両戦を戦って来た歴戦の軍団で“Alamo Force”のニックネームで呼ばれる太平洋方面米軍の主力。
- 3 3 **our Eighth and Tenth Armies** 第六軍団のフィリピン制圧後、その後衛として、代わってフィリピン占領に当たっていた第八軍団と、沖縄戦のために1944年9月、新たに組織されたハワイを拠点とする第十軍団。**the First Army transferred from Europe** Bradley 中将の指揮下に Normandy 上陸作戦に活躍した第一軍団。
- 12 **if Russia were to enter the war** 1945年2月のヤルタ会談で、Stalin は、対独戦終結後2-3ヶ月で対日戦に参戦することを約しており、5月8日の対独戦終結により、アメリカはソ連が7,8月には対日宣戦布告をすることを予期していた。
- 14 **Our air and fleet units... in Japan proper.** 1945年3月以後、東京をはじめとする日本本土の諸都市は、米空軍 B-29 爆撃機による焼夷弾の空爆を受け、焦土と化しつつあった。
- 16 **the armies of the Mikado** “Mikado”は“Shogun”等の語と共に、幕末に西洋に紹介された言葉で、古く野蛮な東洋のイメージと結びつくものであり、ここで天皇をこう呼ぶのは、揶揄(ぎやう)的な言い方である。
- 19 **Acting Secretary of State Grew** 上記 p.2 118 の注参照。
- 27 **the Joint Chiefs and the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee** 上記 p.2 118 注参照。
- 4 3 **his Cabinet colleagues** 陸軍長官 Stimson 及び海軍長官 Forrestal を指す。
- 6 **the closing of the campaign on Okinawa** 沖縄上陸作戦は1945年3月26日に開始され、6月22日終結した。
- 7 **the service chiefs** 陸軍 Marshall, 空軍 Arnold, 海軍 King の三司令官である。
- 26 **The idea... Dr. Albert Einstein,** 核兵器の可能性を初めて Roosevelt に知らしめた、1939年8月2日付の Einstein の書簡を指す。Einstein は、この書簡を、ドイツの原爆開発を警戒した Leo Szilard 等三人の亡命科学者達に要請されて書いたといわれる。詳細は、解説参照。
- 5 10 **I did not.** 副大統領の Truman が、Manhattan 計画の存在さえ知らなかったというこの言明は、信じ難いものであるが、彼の副大統領就任

は1945年1月20日で、Rooseveltの死の4月12日まで、三ヶ月に満たぬ期間この地位にあったにすぎず、また、アメリカの副大統領は、重要政策に参加することがないのが通常であることを考えれば、全くありうべからざることとは言い切れない。いずれにせよ、彼が、大統領就任まで同計画に関与していなかったことは確実である。

- 18 **the V-1 and V-2 rockets** ドイツが開発し、1944年対英戦に使用した新兵器で、厳密に言えば、V-1はロケットではなく爆弾を搭載した無人機で、V-2がロケット弾である。V-1, V-2合わせて650発余りがイギリス本土に落下し、イギリス人を恐怖のどん底に陥れたが、実際上の兵器としての威力はあまりなく、平常の爆撃機による空爆の破壊力には遠く及ばなかった。
- 7 8 **I had then set up a committee of top men....** この「スティムソン臨時委員会」及び「科学者諮問委員会」については、解説参照。
- 8 9 **“We can propose... direct military use.”** Oppenheimerの起草になる、この「科学者諮問委員会」の答申中の句は、Truman, Stimson 両者共に、原爆日本投下を決断せしめた決定的な言葉として引用している。ただしOppenheimerの原文は、この句の前に、科学者間に意見の対立があることを明確に報告しており、Truman, Stimson 両者共に、それを抜きにして、この句のみをコンテクストなしに引用していることは、注意しておくべきであろう。参考までに、Oppenheimerの原文のパラグラフ全体を下に掲げておく。
- The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapon now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this special weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no alternative to direct military use.
- 10 19 **/s/ Thos. T. Handy** この命令書の出された7月24日当時、Truman大統領以下の米国首脳陣はPotsdamに在り、文書中の“the Secretary of War”であるStimsonも、“Chief of Staff, U.S.A.”であるMarshall大将

も、大統領と行動を共にしていた。従って、Potsdamからの Truman 大統領の指令を受けた参謀総長補佐 (Assistant Chief of Staff) の Thomas T. Handy が、参謀総長代行でこの命令書に署名したものであろう。

20 **GSC=General Staff Corps**

27 **B-29** アメリカ空軍の開発した超大型爆撃機で、「空の要塞」(Superfortress) と呼ばれ、1945年春以後の日本本土爆撃に、主役を演じた。Mariana 群島の Saipan, Tinian, Guam の諸島の基地から、二千キロの道のりを飛来し、高度一万メートルの上空から、焼夷弾の雨を降らせて日本の主要都市を焦土と化した。

11 4 **the joint ultimatum of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China** いわゆる「ポツダム宣言」。その全文は、付録として、この記事の後 (pp.12-14) に掲げてある。

15 **August 5 at 7:15 P.M. Washington time** 日本時間8月6日午前8時15分。

The Atomic Bomb and the Surrender of Japan

Henry L. Stimson (1867—1950)

陸軍長官 (Secretary of War) として、Roosevelt, Truman 両大統領に次ぐ重要な地位にあった第二次大戦の米国の最高政治指導者。既に第一次大戦前、四十代で Taft 大統領の下に陸軍長官 (1911—13) を務め、次いで、Hoover 大統領の下に国務長官 (1923—33) として入閣、わが国の満州進攻に対して、中国の領土保全を宣言した Stimson Doctrine を以て対した。1940年、Roosevelt 大統領の下に、再び陸軍長官に就任、以後、戦争終結後の 1945年9月辞任するまでその地位にあって、終始戦争の指導に当たった。殊に、原爆開発の Manhattan 計画に関しては、当初より Roosevelt 大統領の諮問を受けて事実上の最高責任者ともいべき役割を果し、同大統領の死後、Truman 大統領の下に原爆日本投下が決定された時には、投下を答申した「Stimson 臨時委員会」の委員長として、決定的な役割を演じた。

ここに収録するのは、彼の回想録 *On Active Service in Peace and War* の中の、この問題を扱った “The Atomic Bomb and the Surrender of Japan” と題する章からの抜粋で、初め、1947年2月 Stimson が *Harper's Magazine* に寄稿した記事を、McGeorge Bundy が編集整理したものである。Stimson のこの発言は、アメリカ政府当局者の原爆投下決定の弁明としては、最もまとまったものとして知られ、この問題に関する討論の出発点とされて来たものである。

McGeorge Bundy (1919—)

第二次大戦中、二十代の若さで Stimson の下で働き、原爆開発計画の機密にあずかり、戦後 Stimson の回想録の編集に当たった。後に、Harvard 大学教授